

*The U.S. Department of State*

# bulletin

Vol. XIX, No. 483  
October 2, 1948

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# *The Department of State* bulletin

VOL. XIX, No. 483 • PUBLICATION 3295

October 3, 1948

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington 25, D.C.

PRICE:  
52 issues, domestic \$5, foreign \$7.25  
Single copy, 15 cents

Published with the approval of the  
Director of the Bureau of the Budget

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## The Berlin Crisis

### COMMUNIQUE BY U.S., U.K., AND FRANCE

[Released to the press September 26]

*Text of the joint communiqué issued by the three Foreign Ministers in Paris on September 26*

Mr. Schuman, Mr. Bevin and Mr. Marshall met shortly after noon at the Quai d'Orsay to consider the Soviet note of September 25, 1948, relating to the situation in Berlin, caused by the imposition and continuance of the Soviet blockade of rail, road and water communications between Berlin and the Western Zones of occupation in Germany.

In view of the fact that the Soviet Government in violation of the understanding between the Four Powers has chosen to make public unilaterally its version of these negotiations, the three Ministers, authorized the following statement:

"The Governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom are in agreement that the Soviet note of September 25 is unsatisfactory. The Soviet Government fails to provide the assur-

ance requested in the notes from the three governments of September 22, 1948, that the illegal blockade measures be removed. In addition it demands that commercial and passenger traffic between the Western Zones and Berlin, by air as well as by rail, water and road be controlled by the Soviet Command in Germany. This demand of the Soviet Government is restated with emphasis in the official communiqué issued in Moscow. Moreover, in regard to currency, the Soviet note is evasive and does not answer the clear position stated by the three governments.

"Accordingly, the three governments are transmitting a note to the Soviet Government fully setting out their position and informing it that in view of the insistence of the Soviet Government upon maintaining the blockade and upon the institution of restrictions on air communications they are compelled in compliance with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refer the matter to the Security Council."

### U.S. NOTE DELIVERED TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press September 27]

The Acting Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency, the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,<sup>1</sup> and has the honor to transmit the following communication:

1. The Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, conscious of their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations to settle disputes by peaceful means, took the initiative on July 30, 1948 in approaching the Soviet Government for informal discussions in Moscow in order to explore every possibility of adjusting a dangerous situation which had arisen by reason of measures taken by the Soviet Government directly challenging the rights of the other occupying powers in Berlin. These measures, persistently pursued, amounted to a blockade of land and water transport and communication between the Western zones of Germany and Berlin which not only endangered the maintenance of the forces of occupation of the United States, France and the United Kingdom in that city but also

jeopardized the discharge by those Governments of their duties as occupying powers through the threat of starvation, disease and economic ruin for the population of Berlin.

2. The Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom have explicitly maintained the position that they could accept no arrangement which would deny or impair the rights in Berlin acquired by them through the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany and by Four-Power agreements. They were, however, willing to work out in good faith any practical arrangements, consistent with their rights and duties, for restoring to normal the situation in Berlin, including the problems presented by the existence of two currencies in that city.

3. After long and patient discussion, agreement was arrived at in Moscow on a directive to the four Military Governors under which the restrictive measures placed by the Soviet Military Government upon transport and communications

<sup>1</sup> Alexander S. Panyushkin.



between the Western zones and Berlin would be lifted simultaneously with the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet zone as the sole currency for Berlin under Four-Power control of its issue and continued use in Berlin.

4. In connection with the lifting of restrictions and the maintenance of freedom of communication and the transport of persons and goods between Berlin and the Western zones, the agreed directive provided that restrictions recently imposed should be lifted. Generalissimo Stalin during the discussions personally confirmed that this meant the removal also of any restrictions imposed prior to June 18, 1948.

In connection with the currency situation in Berlin, the Soviet authorities insisted that the German mark of the Soviet zone be accepted as the sole currency for Berlin. The three Western occupying powers declared that they were ready to withdraw from circulation in Berlin the Western mark "B" issued in that city and to accept the German mark of the Soviet zone subject to Four-Power control over its issuance, circulation and continued use in Berlin (i.e. in Berlin only and not in the Soviet zone). After long discussions Generalissimo Stalin, on August 23, 1948, personally agreed to this Four-Power control and himself proposed the establishment of a Four-Power Financial Commission which would control the practical implementation of the financial arrangements involved in the introduction and continued circulation of a single currency in Berlin and which, Generalissimo Stalin specifically stated, would have the power to control the German Bank of Emission of the Soviet zone insofar as its operations with respect to Berlin were concerned.

5. It was with these understandings, personally confirmed by Generalissimo Stalin, that the agreed directive was sent to the four Military Governors in Berlin to work out the technical arrangements necessary to put it into effect.

6. Despite these clear understandings, the Soviet Military Governor soon made it plain in the discussions held by the four Military Governors that he was not prepared to abide by the agreed directive.

Although the directive called for the unqualified lifting of the restrictions on transport and communications between the Western zones and Berlin, the Soviet Military Governor failed to comply. What is more he demanded that restrictions should be imposed on air traffic. He endeavored to support his demand by a false interpretation of a decision of the Control Council of November 30, 1945. Actually during the discussions leading up to the decision of the Control Council of November, 1945, to establish air corridors the Soviet military authorities in Berlin had suggested that the traffic in the corridors should be limited to the needs of the military forces. Neither the Control Council,

however, nor any other Four-Power body accepted this proposal and the traffic in the corridors has since been subject only to those safety regulations which were agreed on a Four-Power basis. Other than these agreed safety regulations, no restrictions whatsoever have been or are in existence on the use by aircraft of the occupying powers of air communications in the corridors between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany.

In regard to Four-Power control of the German mark of the Soviet zone in Berlin, the Soviet Military Governor refused to admit, despite the agreement in Moscow, that the Financial Commission should exercise control over the operations with respect to Berlin of the German Bank of Emission of the Soviet zone.

Furthermore, with respect to the question of the control of the trade of Berlin, the position of the Soviet Military Governor amounted to a claim for exclusive Soviet authority over the trade of Berlin with the Western zones of occupation and with foreign countries. This claim was a contradiction of the clear meaning of the agreed directive to the Four Military Governors.

7. Even while discussions were in progress, the Soviet authorities in Berlin tolerated attempts on the part of minority groups sympathetic to their political aims forcibly to overthrow the legal government of the city of Berlin, constituted by democratic elections held under Four-Power supervision. On August 30 the representatives of the three Western occupying powers in Moscow had drawn Mr. Molotov's attention to the disturbed situation in Berlin. They suggested that instructions be sent to the Four Military Governors that they should do all in their power to preserve a favorable atmosphere in Berlin, but Mr. Molotov claimed that such instructions to the Soviet Military Governor were unnecessary. Nevertheless, after that date these attempts to overthrow the city government increased in violence.

8. On September 14, 1948 the representatives of the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, acting on specific instructions, called the attention of the Soviet Government to the Soviet Military Governor's disregard of the agreements reached during the Moscow discussions and requested that he be instructed to give effect to them.

9. The Soviet Government's reply of September 18, however, upheld the Soviet Military Governor's position. The Soviet Government further confirmed its intention to disregard its commitment to lift the restrictions imposed on transport and communications by seeking to impose restrictions which had not before been in effect.

With respect to trade, the Soviet requirement that the licensing of trade with Berlin be placed in the hands of the Soviet military authorities made plain the Soviet Government's intention to obtain exclusive control over the trade of Berlin.



As regards the powers of the Four-Power Financial Commission, the Soviet reply asserted that the Western occupying powers desired to establish control over all operations of the German Bank of Emission. In fact the United States, the United Kingdom and French Military Governors sought only to secure the Soviet Military Governor's acceptance of the agreed principle that the Four-Power Financial Commission should control the operations of the Bank with respect to the financial arrangements relating to the currency changeover and to the continued provision and use of the German mark of the Soviet zone in the city of Berlin, (i.e. in Berlin only and not in the Soviet zone). In the light of Mr. Molotov's statements during the discussion of the Soviet reply, it became clear that no assurance was given that the Soviet Military Governor would be prepared to proceed on the previously agreed basis. Thus in this matter, as in others, the intention of the Soviet Government was manifestly to impose conditions nullifying the authority of the Western occupying powers and to acquire complete control over the city of Berlin.

10. For the Governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom to continue discussions when fundamental agreements previously reached had been disregarded by the Soviet Government would have been futile. It would have been equally fruitless to continue such discussions in the face of the unmistakable intention of the Soviet Government to undermine, and indeed to destroy, the rights of the three Governments as occupying powers in Berlin as a price for lifting the blockade, illegally imposed in the first instance and still unlawfully maintained. The Three Governments therefore despatched identical notes on September 22nd to the Soviet Government. In those notes after restating their position on the specific points at issue they asked the Soviet Government whether it was prepared to remove the blockade measures which it had imposed and thereby to establish conditions which would permit a continuation of discussions.

11. The reply of the Soviet Government in its notes to the three Governments of September 25, 1948 is unsatisfactory.

As regards the introduction and continued circulation and use in Berlin of the German mark of the Soviet zone, the Soviet Government misrepresents the position of the three Western occupying powers. The latter have made it clear from the outset that they do not desire to exercise any control over the financial arrangements in the Soviet zone of occupation, but are insisting on those conditions only which would provide adequate Four-Power control over the financial arrangements for the introduction and continued circulation and use of the German mark of the Soviet zone as the sole currency in Berlin.

As regards control of the trade of Berlin the

Soviet Government contrary to its previous attitude now states its willingness to agree to the establishment of Four-Power control over the issuance of licenses for the import and export of goods provided that agreement is reached on all other questions. It is clear, after more than six weeks of discussions, from the Soviet Government's persistent refusal to remove the blockade measures and its continued insistence on other conditions which would enable it to destroy the authority and rights of the United States, France and the United Kingdom as occupying powers in Berlin that this conditional concession is illusory.

As regards air traffic between Berlin and the Western zones of occupation, the Soviet Government, while neither affirming nor withdrawing the demand for the particular restrictions put forward by the Soviet Military Governor during the discussions in Berlin and confirmed in its reply of September 18th, introduces another requirement to the effect that transport by air of commercial freight and passengers must be placed under the control of the Soviet command.

The Soviet Government's note of September 25 therefore not only ignores the request of the three Governments that the blockade measures should be removed in order that conditions may be established which would permit the continuation of discussions; it also seeks to impose restrictions on transport and communications between Berlin and the Western zones which would place the maintenance of the forces of occupation of the three Western occupying powers and the whole life of the Berlin population within the arbitrary power of the Soviet command, thus enabling the Soviet military authorities to reimpose the blockade at any moment in the future if they so desired.

12. Accordingly, it is apparent that the Soviet Government had no intention of carrying out the undertakings to which it had subscribed during the Moscow discussions in August. In the face of the expressed readiness of the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom to negotiate with the Soviet Government all outstanding questions regarding Berlin and Germany as a whole in an atmosphere free from duress, the Soviet Government has, in fact, persisted in using duress. It has resorted to acts of force rather than to the processes of peaceful settlement. It has imposed and maintained illegal restrictions amounting to a blockade of Berlin. It has failed to work out in good faith Four-Power arrangements for the control of the currency of that city. Even while the Western occupying powers were seeking agreement on measures to implement the understandings reached in Moscow the Soviet military authorities condoned and encouraged attempts to overthrow the legally constituted municipal government of Berlin. These actions are plainly attempts to nullify unilaterally the rights of the Western occupying powers in Berlin, which are



co-equal with those of the Soviet Union and like them are derived from the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany and from Four-Power agreements to which the Soviet Government is a party. Moreover, the use of coercive pressure against the Western occupying powers is a clear violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

13. The issue between the Soviet Government and the Western occupying powers is therefore not that of technical difficulties in communications nor that of reaching agreement upon the conditions for the regulation of the currency for Berlin. The issue is that the Soviet Government has clearly shown by its actions that it is attempting by illegal and coercive measures in disregard of its obligations to secure political objectives to which it is not entitled and which it could not achieve by peaceful means. It has resorted to blockade measures; it has threatened the Berlin population with starvation, disease and economic ruin; it has tolerated disorders and attempted to overthrow the duly elected municipal government of Berlin. The attitude and conduct of the Soviet Government reveal sharply its purpose to continue its illegal and coercive blockade and its unlawful ac-

tions designed to reduce the status of the United States, France and the United Kingdom as occupying powers in Berlin to one of complete subordination to Soviet rule, and thus to obtain absolute authority over the economic, political and social life of the people of Berlin, and to incorporate the city in the Soviet zone.

14. The Soviet Government has thereby taken upon itself sole responsibility for creating a situation, in which further recourse to the means of settlement prescribed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations is not, in existing circumstances, possible, and which constitutes a threat to international peace and security. In order that international peace and security may not be further endangered the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, therefore, while reserving to themselves full rights to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain in these circumstances their position in Berlin, find themselves obliged to refer the action of the Soviet Government to the Security Council of the United Nations.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON  
September 26, 1948.

#### SOVIET NOTE DELIVERED TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press September 27]

*On September 25 the Soviet Ambassador in Washington delivered to the Acting Secretary of State the following reply of the Soviet Government to the third-person note of September 22, 1948*

[Translation]

1. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has acquainted itself with the note of the Government of the USA of September 22, 1948 concerning the negotiations of the four powers which have taken place in Moscow and Berlin on the question of the introduction of the German mark of the Soviet zone as the sole currency in Berlin and concerning the removal of the restrictions on communications, transport and trade between Berlin and the western zones of Germany.

In connection with this the Soviet Government considers it necessary to declare that the position taken by the Government of the USA not only does not facilitate but on the contrary complicates the reaching of agreement concerning the settlement of the situation which has arisen in Berlin as a result of carrying out of a separate currency reform and the introduction of a separate currency in the western zones of Germany and in the western sectors of Berlin, which constituted an extreme and most far reaching measure in execution of the

policy of partitioning Germany being carried out by the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France.

2. In its note the Government of the USA refers to three disputed questions which were mentioned by the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France in the aide memoire of September 14 and by the Government of the USSR in the aide memoire of September 18, 1948.

The Government of the United States of America states that the continuation of the negotiations on the above-mentioned questions on the present basis would be useless and considers that in order to create the conditions which would permit a continuation of the negotiations, there would have to be a removal of the temporary transport restrictions between Berlin and the western zones which were introduced by the Soviet Command for the purpose of protecting the interests of the German population as well as the economy of the Soviet zone of occupation and of Berlin itself.

Such a statement of the Government of the USA is in direct conflict with the agreement reached on August 30 in Moscow between the four governments (the directive to the Military Governors), in which it was stated:

"The Governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the USSR have decided that, subject to agreement being reached

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among the four military governors in Berlin for their practical implementation, the following steps shall be taken simultaneously:

"(a) Restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones, and also on the movement of cargoes to and from the Soviet zone of Germany, which have recently been imposed, shall be lifted;

"(b) The German mark of the Soviet zone shall be introduced as the sole currency for Berlin, and the Western mark B shall be withdrawn from circulation in Berlin."

From the text of the agreement cited above it is evident that the four governments agreed during the negotiations in Moscow on the simultaneous lifting of restrictions on trade and communications between Berlin and the western zones and introduction of the German mark of the Soviet zone as the sole currency in Berlin. The Soviet Government insists on this, since the situation created by the separate measures of the western powers means that the three governments are not limiting themselves to their sovereign administration of the western zones of Germany but wish at the same time to administer in currency and financial matters the Soviet zone of occupation as well, by means of introducing into Berlin, which is in the center of the Soviet zone, their separate currency and thus disrupting the economy of the eastern zone of Germany and in the last analysis forcing the USSR to withdraw therefrom.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary that the agreement reached in Moscow be carried out and considers that further negotiations can be successful only in the event that the other three governments likewise observe that agreement. If the Government of the USA repudiates the agreement reached on August 30, only one conclusion can be drawn therefrom: namely, that the Government of the USA does not wish any agreement between the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France for the settlement of the situation in Berlin.

3. Inasmuch as the position of the Governments of the USA, Great Britain and France on the three

disputed points was set forth in the note of September 22, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to do likewise:

A) As regards air communication between Berlin and the western zones, the establishment by the Soviet Command of a control over the transport of commercial cargoes and passengers is just as necessary in this case as in the case of railway, water and highway transport. The air routes cannot remain uncontrolled, since an understanding has been reached between the four governments to the effect that the agreement must envisage the establishment of a corresponding control over currency circulation in Berlin and the trade of Berlin with the western zones.

B) In the directive to the Military Governors adopted by the four governments on August 30th the functions of control by the four power financial commission of the execution of financial measures connected with the introduction and circulation of a single currency in Berlin were explicitly provided for.

The Soviet Government considers it necessary that this agreement be carried out, including the maximum reduction of occupation costs in Berlin and the establishment of a balanced budget in Berlin (not considered up to this time in the Berlin conversations), which were provided for in that agreement.

C) The Soviet Government has already expressed its agreement that trade between Berlin, third countries and the western zones of Germany should be placed under the control of the four power financial commission. The Soviet Government now declares its readiness to agree to the establishment of four power control likewise over the issuance of import and export licenses, provided agreement is reached on all other questions.

4. Thus the reaching of agreement about the situation in Berlin now depends above all on whether the Governments of Great Britain, the United States of America and France are seeking such agreement.

#### TRI-PARTITE AIDE-MÉMOIRE TO SOVIET GOVERNMENT

"1. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States having received and studied reports from their Military Governors of the discussions in Berlin find it necessary to draw the attention of the Soviet Government to the fact that the position adopted by the Soviet Military Governor during the meetings in Berlin on a number of points deviate from the principles agreed at Moscow between the four Governments and contained in the agreed directive to the four Military Governors. As the Soviet Government is aware, the terms of this directive were finally

agreed after long and careful consideration, and after clarifications as to interpretation had been received from the Soviet Government.

"2. The specific issues on which in the opinion of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the Soviet Military Governor has departed from the understandings reached at Moscow relate to: (1) restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones; (2) the authority and functions of the financial commission, and in particular its relation to the German bank of



emission; and (3) the control of the trade of Berlin.

"3. As to the first, the Soviet Military Governor has presented a proposal which falls outside the agreed principle that the restrictions which have recently been imposed on communications, transport and commerce be lifted. He has proposed that restrictions upon air traffic, not heretofore existing, should now be imposed, and in particular that air traffic to Berlin should be strictly limited to that necessary to meet the needs of the military forces of occupation.

"4. As the Soviet Government is aware, the directive makes no mention of air transport and this question was not discussed at Moscow. The directive reads: 'Restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the western zones and to and from the Soviet zone of Germany which have recently been imposed shall be lifted.' There have been and are no such restrictions on air traffic. The purpose of the directive is to lift restrictions and not to impose new ones. The proposal of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief, therefore, falls outside the scope of the present discussions and is unacceptable.

"5. Secondly, on the question of the authority and functions of the financial commission there should be not the slightest grounds for any misunderstanding. At the meeting on August 23 attended by Premier Stalin and Mr. Molotov and the representatives of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the intention of the directive in regard to the powers of the financial commission including its power to control the operations in Berlin of the German bank of emission was clearly and specifically confirmed by Premier Stalin. The Soviet Military Governor has refused to accept both the meaning of the directive and the clear understanding of the Four Powers reached at Moscow.

"6. Thirdly, there is the question of the control of the trade of Berlin. The position of the Soviet Military Governor during the discussions in Berlin in regard to matters relating to the control of trade between Berlin and the western zones of Germany amounts to a claim for exclusive Soviet authority over such matters. Such a claim is a contradiction of the spirit and meaning of the directive to the four Military Governors to which the four Governments gave their approval and is therefore unacceptable.

"7. In bringing these major points of difference to the notice of the Soviet Government, the Governments of United States, the United Kingdom and France do not wish to imply that these are the only points of difference which have arisen during the conversations in Berlin.

"8. The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States have understood clearly the principles agreed to in Moscow and the

assurances given by Premier Stalin. Their Military Governors in Berlin have acted in accordance with these principles and assurances. The position taken by the Soviet Military Governor, on the contrary, has constituted a departure from what was agreed in Moscow and strikes at the very foundation upon which these discussions were undertaken. The divergencies which have accordingly arisen on these questions are so serious that the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States feel compelled to inquire whether the Soviet Government is prepared to affirm the understandings outlined herein and to issue the necessary instructions to the Soviet Military Governor, confirming the agreed intention of the directive in regard to

"(1) the lifting of all restrictions on communications, transport and commerce imposed after March 30, 1948, without imposition of any new air or other restrictions; and

"(2) the control by the financial commission of the financial arrangements contemplated in the agreed directive, including control of the operations of the Bank of emission with respect to Berlin as specifically confirmed by Premier Stalin; and

"(3) a satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the western zones of Germany in accordance with an agreement to be reached between the four Military Governors which does not involve the unilateral control of such trade by the Soviet Trade Administration and which recognizes the rights of the occupying powers to import in fulfillment of their responsibilities, and to control the proceeds from, food and fuel for the use of the Berlin population and industry.

"9. They believe that only if the steps proposed in the aide memoire are taken would it be possible for the Military Governors to continue their discussions."

Stalin being out of town and unavailable, this *aide-memoire* was delivered to Mr. Molotov by the three Western envoys on September 14.

Molotov expressed the view that progress could be facilitated if, instead of an immediate exchange of communications at the government level, the Military Governors were first to prepare an agreed report of their discussions; and he proposed that they be given two days to do this. The Western envoys pointed out that the Military Governor had already found it impossible to agree on such a joint report. Molotov then reluctantly agreed to submit the *aide-memoire* to his Government for study and reply.

On September 18, Mr. Molotov invited the Western envoys to the Kremlin and handed them the Soviet Government's reply, which was likewise in the form of an *aide-memoire*. The text was as follows:



"1. The Government of the USSR has acquainted itself with the aide memoire dated September 14 last of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the US, which gives a unilateral account of the course of discussions between the four Military Governors in Berlin and which presents incorrectly the position adopted by the Soviet Military Government during those discussions.

"The Soviet Government believes that consideration of the difference referred to in the said aide memoire, which arose during the Berlin discussions in regard to the interpretation of the directive to the Military Governors would have been facilitated and expedited had the four Military Governors submitted to their governments a joint report with an account of the course of discussions. In that event the discussions in Moscow would not have been based on any unilateral communications but on an accurate statement of the positions adopted by all four Military Governors both on points already agreed between them and on points left outstanding. Since, however, the representatives of the three Governments have refused to follow that method of discussion, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to reply to the question raised in the aide memoire.

"The aide memoire of September 14 refers to the following 3 questions: (1) Restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the Western zones; (2) the authority and functions of the financial commission, and in particular its relation to the German Bank of Emission; (3) the control of the trade of Berlin. At the same time it is asserted that the Soviet Military Governor allegedly deviated from the understanding reached on these questions in Moscow.

"The Soviet Government believes this assertion to be without foundation because during the Berlin discussions the Soviet Military Governor strictly followed the agreed directive and the clarifications which had been given by Soviet Government when it was being drawn up in Moscow. Study by the Soviet Government of all materials relating to the Berlin discussions has shown that the reason for the differences which arose during the Berlin discussions lies in the desire of the US, the UK and the French Military Governors to interpret the directive agreed upon in Moscow in a unilateral manner and to give it an interpretation which had not been implied when it was being drawn up and which constitutes a violation of the directive, and with this the Soviet Government is unable to agree.

"2. The directive to the four Military Governors states the following in regard to the first question referred to in the aide memoire of September 14: 'restrictions on communications, transport and commerce between Berlin and the Western zones

and on the traffic of goods to and from the Soviet zone of Germany which have recently been imposed shall be lifted.'

"The concrete proposals submitted by the Soviet Military Governor on this point are in full conformity with the directive and have for their purpose the lifting of all restrictions on communications, transport and commerce, which have been imposed after March 30, 1948, as was stipulated when the directive was drawn up. During consideration of this question the Soviet Military Governor pointed to the necessity of the other three Military Governors complying strictly with the regulations imposed by the Control Council's decision of November 30, 1945 on air traffic for the needs of the occupation forces and this had never been disputed by any of the Military Governors since the adoption of these regulations three years ago. There is no foundation whatsoever for regarding this justified demand of the Soviet Military Governor as an imposition of new restrictions on air traffic, because these regulations had been imposed as far back as 1945 and not after March 30, 1948. Nevertheless, the USA has attempted to deny the necessity of observing the regulations which had been imposed by the Control Council on air traffic of the occupation forces and which remain in force to this very day.

"In view of the above, the Soviet Government believes that the position of the Soviet Military Governor on this question is absolutely correct, while the position of the USA Military Governor, far from being based on the agreed directive, is in contradiction with it. An interpretation to the contrary might lead to an arbitrary denial of any decision previously agreed upon by the Control Council, and to this the Soviet Government cannot give its assent.<sup>2</sup>

"3. The directive to the Military Governors also contains a clear statement regarding the authority and functions of the Financial Commission and regarding the German Bank of Emission.

"This directive was drawn up in full conformity with the preliminary clarifications on this matter

<sup>2</sup> The facts with respect to the Control Council's Nov. 30, 1945, decision are as follows:

During the discussions prior to the establishment of air corridors in 1945 the Soviet Military Authorities in Berlin had in fact suggested that the traffic in the corridors should be limited to the needs of the military forces. The Allied Control Authority (Allied Control Council) did not accept this Soviet proposal and the traffic in the corridors has since then been subject only to agreed safety regulations. No restrictions whatever were in existence on the use by aircraft of the occupying powers of air communications in the corridors between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany on or before Mar. 30, 1948.

This fact was specifically pointed out to Mr. Molotov by the British envoy, Mr. Roberts, immediately upon the receipt and reading of the *aide-memoire* handed to the Western representatives by Mr. Molotov on Sept. 18, 1948.



made by Premier J. V. Stalin on August 23, and referred to in the above-mentioned aide memoire.

"It will be seen from the above text that the authority and functions of the financial commission and of the German Bank of Emission are precisely laid down in the directive, and it was by this that the Soviet Military Governor was guided. According to that directive and to the understanding reached in Moscow by the four powers, the financial commission should not exercise control over all operations of the Bank of Emission in regard to Berlin, but only over those operations of the Bank of Emission in Berlin which are specifically provided for in paragraphs (A), (B), (C), and (D) of the directive. The proposal to establish control of the financial commission over the whole activity of the German Bank of Emission in Berlin was not accepted during the discussion of this question in Moscow because this would have led to such interference on the part of the financial commission in matters of the regulation of currency circulation as is incompatible with the Soviet Administration's responsibility for the regulation of currency circulation in the Soviet zone of occupation.

"Accordingly, the Soviet Government cannot agree to the incorrect interpretation of the agreed directive given in the aide memoire of the Government of France, the UK and the USA, and believes it necessary that the directive should be strictly followed.

"4. As to trade, the previously agreed directive is confined to an instruction to the Military Governors to work out a satisfactory basis for trade between Berlin and third countries and the Western zones of Germany. It will be recalled that on August 23 during the discussions in Moscow, the Soviet Government submitted a definite proposal on this subject, but the question was not considered in detail and was referred to the Military Governors for discussion.

"The proposals on this subject made by the Soviet Military Governor give no reason to assert that they are a contradiction of the spirit and meaning of the agreed directive. On the contrary, the intention of those proposals is to have the directive fulfilled in accordance with the agreements reached in Moscow.

"However, for the purpose of expediting the drawing up of practical arrangements in Berlin the Soviet Government proposes that the Military Governors be given more detailed instructions on this matter than those contained in the agreed directive. The Soviet Government agrees to have trade between Berlin and third countries and the Western zones of Germany placed under the con-

trol of the quadripartite financial commission, which control should provide at the same time for the maintenance of the existing procedure regarding the traffic of goods in and out of Berlin under license of the Soviet Military Administration. The Soviet Government believes that such an instruction would be of help in the drawing up of a concrete agreement on matters of trade with Berlin.

"5. The Soviet Government believes that discussions between the Military Governors in Berlin can yield positive results only in the event that all the Military Governors follow strictly the directives and instructions agreed between the Governments of France, the UK, the US and the USSR."

The Western envoys, after reading this document, stated that they would submit it to their governments for consideration but warned that it would scarcely be acceptable.

After studying the reply just quoted, the three governments delivered to the Soviet Embassies in Washington, London and Paris on September 22, 1948, identical third person notes in the following text:

"(1) The Government of the United States, together with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, has now reviewed the discussions which have taken place on the Berlin situation and which have culminated in the Soviet reply of September 18 to the aide-memoire of the three Governments of September 14, 1948.

"(2) The three Governments find that the Soviet unwillingness to accept previous agreements, to which reference is made in their aide-memoire of September 14, is still preventing a settlement. The reply of the Soviet Government in its aide-memoire of September 18 is unsatisfactory.

"(3) The final position of the three Governments on the specific points at issue is as follows:

"(A) They cannot accept the imposition of any restrictions on air traffic between Berlin and the Western zones.

"(B) They insist that the Finance Commission must control the activities of the German Bank of Emission of the Soviet Zone in so far as they relate to the financial arrangements for the introduction and continued use of the Soviet zone mark as the sole currency in the city of Berlin.

"(C) They insist that trade between Berlin and the Western zones and other countries must be under quadripartite control, including the issuance of licenses.

"(4) After more than six weeks of discussion, the Governments of the United States, France and



the United Kingdom feel that the Soviet Government is now fully acquainted with the position of the three Governments, and that further discussions on the present basis would be useless.

"(5) It is clear that the difficulties that have arisen in the attempts to arrive at practical arrangements which would restore normal conditions in Berlin derive not from technical matters but from a fundamental difference of views between the Governments of the United States, France and the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Government as to the rights and obligations of the occupying powers in Berlin, their right to have access by air, rail, water and road to Berlin and to participate in the administration of the affairs of the city of Berlin. The blockade imposed by the Soviet authorities together with other of their acts in Berlin are in violation of the rights of the three Western occupying powers.

"(6) Accordingly the Government of the United States, in agreement with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, asks the Soviet Government whether, in order to create conditions which would permit a continuance of discussions, it is now prepared to remove the blockade measures, thus restoring the right of the three Western occupying powers to free communications by rail, water, and road, and to specify the date on which this will be done.

"(7) The Foreign Ministers of the three Governments will be meeting shortly in Paris, and they will be glad to have the reply of the Soviet Government as soon as possible."

*September 22, 1948*

#### **Publication of the Report on the Moscow Discussions**

In view of the breakdown of the discussions at Moscow between the representatives of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, centering upon the Berlin crisis, the Department of State on September 27 released a report on the Moscow discussions that reviews the events leading to the breakdown and records the documents in the case.

Section I of the report recalls that the Soviet Government has maintained first that its measures restricting communications, transport, and commerce between Berlin and Western Germany were necessitated by "technical difficulties" and then that they were "defensive" against conditions created by the currency reform in Western Germany and Western Berlin. The chronological record of events, however, from March 30 to September 26, 1948, reveals that many of the Soviet restrictive measures were imposed months before

the currency reform and that they have been systematic products of a deliberate coercive purpose rather than the results of "technical difficulties".

Section II records the Moscow discussions that started on July 30, when the three Western Powers, unable to see either Molotov or Vishinsky, held a meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin. The first meeting with Foreign Minister Molotov and Generalissimo Stalin took place on August 2. In the course of events, from the original request by the Western Powers for discussions on the Berlin crisis to the ultimate breakdown of negotiations, the following statements, notes, and proposals are reproduced either in part or in full in the report: The American note of July 6 and the Soviet reply of July 14; the Western request for discussion with Stalin and Molotov and the U.S. *aide-memoire* of July 30; accounts of the meetings with Zorin on July 30 and with Molotov on July 31; the record of the first meeting with Stalin, including his proposals. In the drafting meetings with Foreign Minister Molotov, the initial Western draft of August 6 is printed together with Mr. Molotov's counter-draft; also printed are Ambassador Smith's statement on behalf of the Western Powers of August 12, Mr. Molotov's reaction, the Western draft text of August 17, and Mr. Molotov's counter-draft of August 17.

The following documents relating to the second meeting with Stalin on August 23 are reproduced: his statements on August 23; U.S. views telegraphed to Ambassador Smith; draft communiqué and directive of August 27 worked out with Molotov and Vishinsky; and the directive of August 30 sent to Military Governors in Berlin. The technical discussions in Berlin from August 31 to September 7 are commented on briefly. The text of the new *aide-memoire* of the Western Powers delivered in Moscow on September 14 is printed together with Mr. Molotov's *aide-memoire* of September 18 in reply, and the notes delivered by the three Governments to the Soviet Embassies in Washington, London, and Paris on September 22. The last documents included in the report include the Soviet note of September 25, the communiqué issued in Paris on September 26 by the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and the note delivered on September 26 by the Acting Secretary of State in Washington to the Soviet Ambassador.

Copies of *The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions, 1948*, Department of State publication 3298, may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C., for 20 cents each.



## THE THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PARIS

### No Compromise on Essential Freedoms

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY MARSHALL ON SEPTEMBER 23, 1948

Chairman, U.S. Delegation

[Released to the press September 23]

MR. PRESIDENT, FELLOW DELEGATES: We are particularly happy to meet here in Paris. France has, through the centuries, nourished the arts and sciences for the enrichment of all mankind and its citizens have striven persistently for expanding freedom for the individual. It is entirely fitting that this General Assembly, meeting in France which fired the hearts of men with the Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789, should consider in 1948 the approval of a new declaration of human rights for free men in a free world.

#### U.N. Charter as Protection for Free Men

Not only is it appropriate that we should have reaffirmed our respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms but that we should renew our determination to develop and protect those rights and freedoms. Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; the right of a people to choose their own government, to take part in its work, and, if they become dissatisfied with it, to change it; the obligation of government to act through law—these are some of the elements that combine to give dignity and worth to the individual.

The Charter of the United Nations reflects these concepts and expressly provides for the promotion and protection of the rights of man, as well as for the rights of nations. This is no accident. For in the modern world, the association of free men within a free state is based upon the obligation of citizens to respect the rights of their fellow citizens. And the association of free nations in a free world is based upon the obligation of all states to respect the rights of other nations.

Systematic and deliberate denials of basic human rights lie at the root of most of our troubles and threaten the work of the United Nations. It is not only fundamentally wrong that millions of men and women live in daily terror of secret police, subject to seizure, imprisonment, or forced labor without just cause and without fair trial, but these wrongs have repercussions in the community of nations. Governments which systematically disregard the rights of their own people are not

likely to respect the rights of other nations and other people and are likely to seek their objectives by coercion and force in the international field.

The maintenance of these rights and freedoms depends upon adherence to the abiding principles of justice and morality embodied in the rule of law. It will, therefore, always be true that those Members of the United Nations which strive with sincerity of purpose to live by the Charter and to conform to the principles of justice and law proclaimed by it, will be those states which are genuinely dedicated to the preservation of the dignity and integrity of the individual.

Let this third regular session of the General Assembly approve by an overwhelming majority the Declaration of Human Rights as a standard of conduct for all; and let us, as Members of the United Nations, conscious of our own shortcomings and imperfections, join our effort in good faith to live up to this high standard.

#### Recent Economic and Social Progress

Our aspirations must take into account men's practical needs—improved living and working conditions, better health, economic and social advancement for all, and the social responsibilities which these entail. The United Nations is pledged in the Charter to promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development".

The Secretary-General has devoted a considerable part of his annual report to the nature of the progress thus far made in this field. It is evident from the record that we can be encouraged by what is being done. The United Nations is directly engaged in efforts to alleviate the social and economic disorder and destruction resulting from the war. The International Refugee Organization is giving assistance to displaced persons. The International Children's Emergency Fund is providing emergency aid to children and mothers over wide areas. As part of the United Nations efforts to increase productivity by applying new and advanced techniques, the Food and Agriculture Organization is broadening the use of improved seeds and fertilizers. The tuberculosis



project jointly sponsored by the World Health Organization and the International Children's Emergency Fund represents another example of the constructive work of our organization.

Through the United Nations we are seeking to combine our efforts to promote international trade, to solve the difficulties of foreign exchange, to facilitate the voluntary migration of peoples, and to increase the flow of information and ideas across national boundaries. The International Trade Organization charter would establish procedures for expanding multilateral trade, with the goal of raising living standards and maintaining full employment. The Conference on Freedom of Information was responsible for the conventions made before this Assembly which embody principles and procedures for expanding the exchange of information. It is our hope that the Assembly will give these conventions thoughtful and favorable consideration. While the United Nations and its related agencies are increasingly helpful in the economic and social field, primary responsibility for improving standards of living will continue to rest with the governments of the peoples themselves. International organizations cannot take the place of national and personal effort, or local initiative and individual imagination. International action cannot replace self-help, nor can we move toward general cooperation without maximum mutual help among close neighbors.

#### Deep Rift Among Nations Must Be Checked

The United Nations was not intended to preclude cooperative action among groups of states for common purposes consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. It has been disappointing that efforts at economic recovery consistent with this concept have been actively opposed by some who seem to fear the return of stability and confidence. We must not be misled by those who, in the name of revolutionary slogans, would prevent reconstruction and recovery to hold out illusions of future well-being at the price of starvation and disorder today.

A year ago I expressed the view to the General Assembly that "a supreme effort is required from us all if we are to succeed in breaking through the vicious circles of deepening political and economic crisis". I believe that most of us in this organization have sought to make such an effort—and that this is beginning to bring results.

Despite the cooperative action of most nations to rebuild peace and well-being, tension during the past year has increased. The leaders of the other nations are creating a deep rift between their countries and the rest of the world community. We must not allow that rift to widen any further, and we must redouble our efforts to find a common ground. Let us go back to the Charter, to words that were solemnly written by the peoples of the

United Nations while the tragedy of war was vividly stamped on their minds.

"We the peoples of the United Nations", says the Charter, are "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . and for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors". Three years later, we are confronted with the need to save not only succeeding generations, but also our own.

The first purpose of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security and to that end all members are pledged to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.

We are pledged to seek an accommodation by which different cultures, different laws, different social and economic structures, and different political systems can exist side by side without violence, subversion, or intimidation. An elementary requirement is that international obligations be respected and that relations among states be based on mutual confidence, respect, and tolerance.

How can we establish among governments and peoples the confidence which is necessary to a just and stable peace and is basic to the work of the United Nations? The need at this session of the General Assembly and in subsequent months is to achieve, or at least to move nearer, a settlement of the major issues which now confront us. For its part, the United States is prepared to seek in every possible way, in any appropriate forum, a constructive and peaceful settlement of the political controversies which contribute to the present tension and uncertainty.

I do not wish to deal at this time with the details of any particular issue, but there are broad lines along which a just and equitable settlement of each of these questions might be reached. Some of these matters are on the agenda of the United Nations, others, such as those dealing with the peace settlements, are to be dealt with in other forums. Nevertheless, whatever the forum, as members of the United Nations, we are all subject to the principles of the Charter.

If we want to have peace we must settle the issues arising out of the last war. The Charter was written with the expectation that the solution of the problems before the United Nations would not be made more difficult by long delay in completing the peace settlements.

#### Goals Toward Peace

*Germany, Japan, and Austria.* We should, therefore, make every effort to achieve an early and just peace settlement so that Japan and Germany may exist as democratic and peaceful nations, subject to safeguards against the revival of



## THE UNITED NATIONS AND SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

military or economic means of aggression, and so that they may in due course demonstrate their qualification for admission to membership in the United Nations. In Austria our aim is the restoration of its political and economic freedom within its 1937 frontiers and its immediate admission as a Member of the United Nations.

Other questions affecting world peace are now before the United Nations, some of them before this Assembly. We believe that the ends to be sought on these matters may be briefly summarized as follows:

*Palestine.* A Palestine free from strife and the threat of strife, with both the Jews and Arabs assured the peaceful development envisaged by the actions of the General Assembly and the Security Council; an early demobilization of armed forces to permit the return to conditions of peace and normal living in Palestine; the repatriation of refugees who wish to return and live in peace with their neighbors; economic aid to Jews and Arabs to restore and strengthen their economic well-being; the admission of Transjordan and Israel to membership in the United Nations.

*Korea.* A unified and independent Korea, accepted as a member of the United Nations, acting under a constitution and a government selected by the Koreans themselves through free elections, and receiving the economic and political encouragement which it will need as it embarks upon its new life as a Korean Nation.

*Greece.* A Greece made secure from aggressive and unlawful interference from without, ordering its political life by the democratic process and by respect for law, enabled to rebuild its economy and to provide its people the essentials of a decent life which they have been without for so long.

*Indonesia.* A negotiated settlement without further bloodshed in Indonesia, along the broad lines of the Renville agreement, providing within a brief period both the sovereign independence sought by the peoples of Indonesia and continued cooperation between them and the people of the Netherlands.

*India and Pakistan.* Continuation of the mediation and negotiation between the great nations of India and Pakistan with respect to Kashmir, in order that the processes of peaceful settlement may bring to a conclusion an issue which has been charged with great dangers.

*Atomic Energy.* The early adoption of an international system for the control of atomic energy, providing for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, and for safeguards to insure compliance by all nations with the necessary international measures of control.

*Armaments.* Under adequate and dependable

guaranty against violation, a progressive reduction in armaments as rapidly as the restoration of political confidence permits.

## Other Problems

Other situations or problems might be mentioned, but if constructive steps are taken toward the settlement of those which have been indicated, new hope would arise among men and new confidence among the nations of the world. It will be readily seen that the above pattern is toward peace. No governments or peoples who work toward such ends can be held to be seeking war, or imperialist expansion, or disorder and strife.

*Trusteeship.* We have noted with particular interest the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the nations relating to the millions of people who are not yet fully self-governing. We are mindful of the obligations undertaken in the Charter for the political, economic, and social development of these peoples. We believe that all possible assistance and encouragement should be given to them, to the end that they may play their full part in the family of nations—either as independent states or in freely chosen association with other states.

*Membership.* In our efforts toward political settlement we must continue working to improve the functioning of the machinery of the United Nations. We hope that the Security Council will proceed to recommend during this session of the General Assembly the admission of additional new members. There are a number of fully qualified states, now awaiting admission, whose elevation has been supported by the United States but has been blocked for reasons not consistent with the Charter. The most recent application, Ceylon, one of the few states to emerge in southern Asia, has been denied the membership to which it properly aspires.

*Interim Committee.* The report of the Interim Committee on the problem of voting in the Security Council represents the first comprehensive study on this vital problem since San Francisco and contains the views of an overwhelming majority of the members. The work of the Security Council would be greatly facilitated if the recommendations of the Interim Committee could be accepted by the members of the Council.

The Interim Committee itself has worked usefully and effectively during the past year and can continue to render an important service to the General Assembly. We hope that the Assembly will agree to its continuation for another year in order to give us more experience before deciding whether it should become a permanent part of our Organization.

*Need for U.N. Guard.* The United States joins in expressing great appreciation to those individuals who have served on United Nations missions



during the past year, either as members of national delegations or of the Secretariat. These representatives in the field have served with courage and devotion to duty. Their service has been given a particularly solemn reminder of these conditions by the tragic death of Count Folke Bernadotte and Colonel Serot at the hands of assassins. The people of the United States join in tribute to the man who worked brilliantly and courageously as the United Nations mediator in Palestine. We pay tribute also to those others who have lost their lives in the service of peace.

We believe that the Assembly should give sympathetic consideration to the suggestions of the Secretary-General for the establishment of a small United Nations guard force to assist United Nations missions engaged in the pacific settlement of disputes. The fate of the Mediator in Palestine and the experience of the several commissions already working in the field have already demonstrated the need for such a group. This great world organization should not send its servants on missions of peace without reasonable protection. The guards would be entirely distinct from the armed forces envisaged under article 43 and would not carry out military operations. They could, however, perform important services in connection with United Nations missions abroad not only as guards but also as observers and as communications and transportation personnel.

#### Minority Position Self-Imposed

Mr. President, one of the principal purposes of the United Nations, according to article 1, is "to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of the common ends" set forth in the Charter. The problem of making and keeping the peace involves many governments and many peoples. On the issues which call for settlement, the large powers as well as the small must submit their policies to the judgment of the world community. For this purpose appropriate forums have been established for the adjustment of differences through the impartial opinions of the international society. This process has been seriously hampered by the refusal of a group of nations to

participate in certain of the important commissions established by this Assembly, such as the Balkan Commission, the Korean Commission, and the Interim Committee.

More important than this boycott, however, is the disturbing lack of cooperation which the United Nations has received in its efforts to resolve such questions as Korea and Greece and to bring about the international control of atomic energy. This persistent refusal of a small minority to contribute to the accomplishment of our agreed purposes is a matter of profound concern.

There is no plot among Members of this Organization to keep any nation or group of nations in a minority. The minority position is self-imposed. The record shows that there are no mechanical majorities at the disposal of any nation or group of nations. Majorities form quickly in support of the principles of the Charter. Nations consistently in the minority would be welcomed among the ranks of the majority—but not at the price of compromise of basic principle.

#### Patience in Understanding

The United Nations has sought to promote the free exchange of ideas on a basis of full reciprocity. The effort is of the greatest political importance. Any government which by deliberate action cuts itself and its people off from the rest of the world becomes incapable of understanding the problems and policies of other governments and other peoples. It would be a tragic error, if, because of such misunderstanding, the patience of others should be mistaken for weakness.

The United States does not wish to increase the existing tension. It is its wholehearted desire to alleviate that tension. But we will not compromise essential principles. We will under no circumstances barter away the rights and freedoms of other peoples. We earnestly hope that all Members will find ways of contributing to the lessening of tensions and the promotion of peace with justice. The peoples of the earth are anxiously watching our efforts here. We must not disappoint them.



## Conclusions From Progress Report of the U.N. Mediator on Palestine <sup>1</sup>

### MEDIATION EFFORT

#### VIII. Conclusions

1. Since I presented my written Suggestions to the Arab and Jewish authorities on 27 June, I have made no formal submission to either party of further suggestions or proposals for a definitive settlement.<sup>2</sup> Since that date, however, I have held many oral discussions in the Arab capitals and Tel Aviv, in the course of which various ideas on settlement have been freely exchanged. As regards my original Suggestions, I hold to the opinion that they offered a general framework within which a reasonable and workable settlement might have been reached, had the two parties concerned been willing to discuss them. They were flatly rejected, however, by both parties. Since they were put forth on the explicit condition that they were purely tentative, were designed primarily to elicit views and counter-suggestions from each party, and, in any event, could be implemented only if agreed upon by both parties, I have never since pressed them. With respect to one basic concept in my Suggestions, it has become increasingly clear to me that however desirable a political and economic union might be in Palestine, the time is certainly not now propitious for the effectuation of any such scheme.

2. I do not consider it to be within my province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations a proposed course of action on the Palestine question. That is a responsibility of the Members acting through the appropriate organs. In my role as United Nations Mediator, however, it was inevitable that I should accumulate information and draw conclusions from my experience which might well be of assistance to Members of the United Nations in charting the future course of United Nations action on Palestine. I consider it my duty, therefore, to acquaint the Members of the United Nations, through the medium of this report, with certain of the conclusions on means of peaceful adjustment which have evolved from my frequent consultations with Arab and Jewish authorities over the past three and one-half months and from my personal appraisal of the present Palestinian scene. I do not suggest that these conclusions would provide the basis for a proposal which would readily win the willing approval of both parties. I have not, in the course of my intensive

<sup>1</sup> Excerpts from U.N. doc. A/648 (part one, p. 29; part two, p. 23; and part three, p. 11), Sept. 18, 1948. The report was signed by Folke Bernadotte in Rhodes on Sept. 16, 1948.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of July 25, 1948, p. 105.

#### Statement by Secretary Marshall

[Released to the press September 21]

The United States considers that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte offer a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question. My Government is of the opinion that the conclusions are sound and strongly urges the parties and the General Assembly to accept them in their entirety as the best possible basis for bringing peace to a distracted land.

No plan could be proposed which would be entirely satisfactory in all respects to every interested party. The United Nations has endeavored to achieve a solution by peaceful adjustment and entrusted the task to its mediator, Count Bernadotte. He energetically, courageously, and with a spirit of complete fairness, we feel, canvassed all the possibilities and proposed as his last contribution toward a world of peace a sound basis for settlement. He gave his life to this effort.

The complexities of the problem and the violent emotions which have been engendered are such that the details of any plan could be debated endlessly. As a matter of fact, the debate on this question has been carried on for years in almost every kind of public forum. It is our sincere hope that the parties concerned will realize that their best interests and the interests of the world community will be served by accepting in a spirit of fair compromise the judgment of Count Bernadotte.

efforts to achieve agreement between Arabs and Jews, been able to devise any such formula. I am convinced, however, that it is possible at this stage to formulate a proposal which, if firmly approved and strongly backed by the General Assembly, would not be forcibly resisted by either side, confident as I am, of course, that the Security Council stands firm in its resolution of 15 July that military action shall not be employed by either party in the Palestine dispute. It cannot be ignored that the vast difference between now and last November is that a war has been started and stopped and that in the intervening months decisive events have occurred.

#### SEVEN BASIC PREMISES

3. The following seven basic premises form the basis for my conclusions:

##### *Return to peace*

(a) Peace must return to Palestine and every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored.

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*The Jewish State*

(b) A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.

*Boundary determination*

(c) The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations.

*Continuous frontiers*

(d) Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories, whose frontiers should not therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the resolution of 29 November.

*Right of repatriation*

(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

*Jerusalem*

(f) The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interest involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

*International responsibility*

(g) International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.

**SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS**

4. The following conclusions, broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement:

(a) Since the Security Council, under pain of Chapter VIII sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dispute, hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, an armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision.

(b) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish

territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries commission appointed by and responsible to the United Nations, with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November in order to make them more equitable, workable and consistent with existing realities in Palestine.

- (i) The area known as the Negev, south of a line running from the sea near Majdal east southeast to Faluja (both of which places would be in Arab territory), should be defined as Arab territory;
- (ii) The frontier should run from Faluja north northeast to Ramleh and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory), the frontier at Lydda then following the line established in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November;
- (iii) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.

(c) The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connection and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

(d) The United Nations, by declaration or other appropriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned.

(e) The port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the administration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries, whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

(f) The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.

(g) The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November,



should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

(h) The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned.

(k) In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Palestine conciliation commission. This commission, which should be appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority. The commission, assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake

- (i) To employ its good offices to make such recommendations to the parties or to the United Nations, and to take such other steps as may be appropriate, with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine;
- (ii) Such measures as it might consider appropriate in fostering the cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews;
- (iii) To supervise the observance of such boundary, road, railroad, free port, free airport, minority rights and other arrangements as may be decided upon by the United Nations;

- (iv) To report promptly to the United Nations any development in Palestine likely to alter the arrangements approved by the United Nations in the Palestine settlement or to threaten the peace of the area.

## SUPERVISION OF THE TWO TRUCES

### V. Some Conclusions Regarding the Truce Operation

1. The supervision of the truce is a continuing responsibility and it is neither necessary nor desirable at this stage to formulate any definitive views concerning the operation. The experience thus far gained in the supervision of two truces extending over a total period of more than three months has been very valuable, however, and on the basis of this experience certain analyses and conclusions may even now be usefully set forth.

2. In assessing in general terms the entire period of truce, my dual role of Mediator and of supervisor of truce observation is an important factor. Conditions of truce, even though subject to frequent minor and occasional major infractions by both parties, provide a peaceful basis indispensable to the task of mediation. At the same time, organizing and supervising truce observance make imperative demands on time and staff. I am inevitably drawn into the settlement of disputes arising solely out of the truce, and it may be readily appreciated that my position and decisions as truce supervisor cannot, in the minds of the disputants, be easily dissociated from my role in the more fundamental task of mediation.

3. The situation in Jerusalem has been considerably more tense and difficult during the second truce than during the first. This fact is due to a complex of reasons among which are the change in military dispositions between truces, and the increased concentration of manpower which appears to have taken place there in the interval between the truces. The special importance which each side attaches to the status of Jerusalem in a general settlement of the Palestine problem is, in the circumstances, a constant influence tending to heighten the tension there.

4. However, the situation in Jerusalem has shown recent improvement. The decision of the Security Council on 19 August fixing the responsibility of the parties under the cease-fire order, a considerable increase in the number of United Nations Observers stationed there, and intensive efforts to achieve localized demilitarization agreements, have produced beneficial results. Nevertheless, the conditions in Jerusalem are such that not even the increased number of Observers now there could for long maintain the truce in the City



if it should appear likely that a settlement would be indefinitely deferred.

5. United Nations supervision of the regular food convoys of Jerusalem has been an important feature of both truces. The movement of these convoys involved difficult negotiation and constant supervision and escort. Apart from some sniping activity during the early days of each truce, the convoy system has worked remarkably well. On the other hand, persistent efforts to ensure the flow of water to Jerusalem through the main pipe-lines have met with failure during both truces, the destruction of the Latrun pumping station having so far nullified all efforts to solve the problem during the second truce.

6. The period of the first truce coincided with the ripening of cereal crops in Palestine. Since the front lines ran almost entirely through land belonging to Arab cultivators, a great number of fields bearing crops was in no-man's land or behind Jewish positions. Attempts by Arabs to harvest crops in no-man's land and in the vicinity of and sometimes behind Jewish positions often led the Jews to react by firing on the harvesters. This was a major complication during the first truce, both before and after my ruling of 16 June, and explains many of the breaches of truce and the difficulties of truce observation over a wide area. During the second truce, incidents of this nature have been relatively few, since the harvest season for cereal crops is over. The efforts of Observers in securing local agreements regarding harvesting of crops undoubtedly saved many crops that would otherwise have been lost.

7. The fact that in the Negev there is no continuous front line has been, during both truces, a special cause of difficulty as a result of the need for each side to by-pass the other's positions in order to supply some of its own positions. Convoys under United Nations supervision largely solved the problem, though not without friction, during the first truce. During the second truce a similar system was proposed, but agreement on conditions could not be reached with the parties. Consequently, on 14 September I laid down the terms governing future convoys in the Negev.

8. In considering the effectiveness of the truce supervision, attention must be paid to two distinct, though related, aspects of the problem. On the one hand, there is the problem of observing the actual fighting fronts, of dealing with incidents which may arise there and preventing, if possible, any further outbreak of hostilities. On the other hand, there is the observation which is necessary over a vast area to check whether or not materials and men are being moved in a manner to confer a military advantage contrary to the terms of the

truce. As regards the second aspect of this problem, an important consideration is that the area under observation covers a very large part of the Middle East and that the necessity to concentrate a majority of the limited number of Observers at my disposal near the fighting fronts restricts the number available for duties elsewhere. The availability of an increased number of Observers has enabled me to ensure a more extensive supervision, especially in territories outside Palestine.

9. Experience has shown that the more quickly action can be taken to deal with a local violation, the more easily incidents are controlled or prevented. It must be admitted that, on occasion, slowness to act, often because of circumstances beyond control, has hampered the operation of the truce supervision. Although the Secretary-General of the United Nations has given me the fullest co-operation and every assistance available to him, it is apparent that the United Nations was not in position as regards Observer personnel, armed guards, communications and transportation equipment or budgetary provision to set up rapidly the elaborate machinery of truce observation required.

10. The second truce differed from the first principally in the fact that it was ordered by the Security Council under threat of further action under Chapter VII of the Charter, and that no time limit was set. This introduced a new element into the situation as compared with the first truce, in that the second truce involved compliance with a Security Council order. There is a tendency on each side to regard alleged breaches by the other side of a truce which has been ordered by the Security Council as calling for prompt action by that Council. Both sides now evidence a sense of grievance and complain that the compulsory prolongation of the truce is contrary to their interests. This feeling is inevitably reflected in their attitudes toward the Observers and truce obligations in general. The truce undoubtedly imposes a heavy burden on both sides, but even so, the burden of war would be heavier.

11. The truce is not an end in itself. Its purpose is to prepare the way for a peaceful settlement. There is a period during which the potentiality for constructive action, which flows from the fact that a truce has been achieved by international intervention, is at a maximum. If, however, there appears no prospect of relieving the existing tension by some arrangement which holds concrete promise of peace, the machinery of truce supervision will in time lose its effectiveness and become an object of cynicism. If this period of maximum tendency to forego military action as a means of achieving a desired settlement is not seized, the advantage gained by international intervention may well be lost.



## ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

### VI. Conclusions

1. Conclusions which may be derived from the experience to date are summarized as follows:

(a) As a result of the conflict in Palestine there are approximately 360,000 Arab refugees and 7,000 Jewish refugees requiring aid in that country and adjacent States.

(b) Large numbers of these are infants, children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. Their condition is one of destitution and they are "vulnerable groups" in the medical and social sense.

(c) The destruction of their property and the loss of their assets will render most of them a charge upon the communities in which they have sought refuge for a minimum period of one year (through this winter and until the end of the 1949 harvest).

(d) The Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not citizens or subjects of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, the States which are at present providing them with a refuge and the basic necessities of life. As residents of Palestine, a former mandated territory for which the international community has a continuing responsibility until a final settlement is achieved, these Arab refugees understandably look to the United Nations for effective assistance.

(e) The temporary alleviation of their condition, which is all that my disaster relief programme can promise them now, is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need, unless the resources in supplies and personnel available are greatly increased. Such increased resources might indirectly be of permanent value in establishing social services in the countries concerned, or improving greatly existing services. This applies particularly to general social administrative organizations, maternal and child care services, the training of social workers, and the improvement of food economics.

(f) The refugees, on return to their homes, are entitled to adequate safeguards for their personal security, normal facilities for employment, and adequate opportunities to develop within the community without racial, religious or social discrimination.

(g) So long as large numbers of the refugees remain in distress, I believe that responsibility for their relief should be assumed by the United Na-

tions in conjunction with the neighbouring Arab States, the Provisional Government of Israel, the specialized agencies, and also all the voluntary bodies or organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

2. In concluding this part of my report, I must emphasize again the desperate urgency of this problem. The choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die. The situation of the majority of these hapless refugees is already tragic, and to prevent them from being overwhelmed by further disaster and to make possible their ultimate rehabilitation, it is my earnest hope that the international community will give all necessary support to make the measures I have outlined fully effective. I believe that for the international community to accept its share of responsibility for the refugees of Palestine is one of the minimum conditions for the success of its efforts to bring peace to that land.

### Position on Withdrawing Occupying Forces From Korea

[Released to the press September 20]

It has been the consistent view of this Government that the best interests of the Korean people would be served by the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Korea at the earliest practicable date. This same view was embodied in the United Nations General Assembly resolution of November 14, 1947, in which provision was made for such withdrawal as soon as practicable after the establishment of the Korean Government which it was the intention of that resolution to bring into being. Had the Soviet Union cooperated in carrying out the provisions of the resolution of November 14, 1947, the question of troop withdrawal from Korea would doubtless have been already resolved.

The United States Government regards the question of the withdrawal of occupying forces as but one facet of the entire question of the unity and independence of Korea. The General Assembly of the United Nations has taken cognizance of this larger question, as evidenced by the resolution referred to above, and may be expected to give further consideration to the matter at its forthcoming meeting.



## The United States in the United Nations

### THIRD REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The Third Regular Session of the General Assembly opened in Paris at the Palais de Chaillot on September 21. At its first plenary session the Assembly elected Dr. Herbert V. Evatt (Australia) as its President and Paul-Henri Spaak (Belgium) as Chairman of the Political and Security Committee (Committee I).

#### Secretary Marshall's Address

In his address before the General Assembly on September 23, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, stated that the United States does not want to increase existing tension in the United Nations but "we will not compromise essential principles" and "we will under no circumstances barter away the rights and freedoms of other peoples. We earnestly hope that all Members will find ways of contributing to the lessening of tensions and the promotion of peace with justice." The Secretary warned that those nations who are creating a deep rift between our countries and the rest of the world community must not be permitted to widen that rift any further.

#### Agenda

General debate got under way at the second meeting of the Assembly on September 23, when 70 agenda items were allocated among the appropriate committees. New items approved for the agenda included the question of extending the U.N. Appeal for Children through next year; future of former Italian colonies; Mediator's report on Palestine; creation of U.N. Guard force; and reparation for those injured in U.N. service.

Andrei Vyshinsky (U.S.S.R.) on September 25 introduced a resolution calling upon the major powers to reduce all their armaments by one third within a year. The resolution would have the Assembly recommend that an international control body be established by the Security Council, where the veto prevails, "for the supervision and control over implementation of measures for reduction of armaments and armed forces and for prohibition of atomic weapons."

A member of the U.S. Delegation pointed out that the United States welcomes the emphasis that the Soviet Union places upon the importance of the regulation and reduction of armaments. The development of a necessary basis for a system for control of atomic energy is the crucial aspect of the problem of armaments regulation. The Soviet Union in former discussions in the Atomic Energy Commission had rejected such a plan. The U.S. spokesman continued that the position of the United States on this question has been repeatedly stated and has been recently confirmed by a vote of the United States Senate.

On September 28 the General Assembly agreed

to add to its agenda the Soviet proposal, and the item was referred to Committee I.

The United States on September 29 charged the Soviet Union with action in the Berlin situation constituting a threat to the peace under the meaning of the U.N. Charter, and it requested the Security Council to consider the case as soon as possible. Ambassador Austin signed the U.S. request and sent it to the Secretary-General at the same time that identical notifications from Great Britain and France were delivered. In this request the three Governments draw attention to "the serious situation which has arisen as the result of the unilateral imposition by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of restrictions on transport and communications between the Western zones of occupation in Germany and Berlin."

On September 30, Ambassador Austin told Committee I that only international control of atomic energy could assure long-time security. Mr. Austin renewed the U.S. offer to share its atomic knowledge with the world under an international control system which would provide safeguards against "destructive rivalry in atomic weapons." The vast U.S. atomic-development plant, Mr. Austin said, would be placed under an international agency after that agency is deemed to be in effective operation. This procedure, according to the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, is vital to assure against what would amount to unilateral disarmament by the United States under a proposal such as that of the Soviet Union whereby discussion of control plans must await prohibition and destruction of existing atomic weapons. Mr. Austin recalled that the Soviet proposal was studied at length by the Commission whose majority "reached conclusions which are briefly described by these words from the Commission reports: 'completely unrealistic', 'feeble', and 'fundamentally inadequate'."

The Soviet proposal, Mr. Austin explained, "would allow any nation to carry on scientific research regardless of dangerous materials or facilities involved. The U.N. Commission in its third report declares that in the Soviet proposal 'there appears to be no limit to the clandestine activities that may take place in laboratories ostensibly devoted to peaceful work.'"

"Should a violation of security be discovered the international agency must be empowered to prevent its fruition and correct the damage done to the cause of peace. The Commission provided for this by holding that judicial or other processes for the determination of violations and punishments must be certain and swift. And there must, the Commission said, be no legal right by veto or otherwise whereby a wilful violator could thwart punishment and evade the consequences of violation."



# INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

## Calendar of Meetings <sup>1</sup>

### Adjourned during September

Council of Foreign Ministers: Deputies for Italian Colonial Problems .	London . . . . .	Oct. 3, 1947-Sept. 1, 1948
<b>1948</b>		
18th International Geological Congress . . . . .	London . . . . .	Aug. 25-Sept. 1
Ito (International Trade Organization): Meeting of Interim Commission.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 25-Sept. 15
United Nations: Economic and Social Council, Subcommittee on Statistical Sampling.	Geneva . . . . .	Aug. 30-
Iru (International Telecommunication Union): Meeting of Administrative Council.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 1-
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization): Expert Conference for High Altitude Stations.	Interlaken, Switzerland . .	Sept. 1-4
Sixth International Congress and Exposition of Photogrammetry . .	The Hague . . . . .	Sept. 1-10
XXXVII General Assembly of the Interparliamentary Union . . .	Rome . . . . .	Sept. 6-14
Royal Netherlands Industries Fair . . . . .	Utrecht . . . . .	Sept. 7-16
Inter-American Conference on the Conservation of Renewable Natural Resources.	Denver . . . . .	Sept. 7-20
Iro (International Refugee Organization): Seventh Part of First Session of Preparatory Commission.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 10-
Council of Foreign Ministers: Discussions on the Disposition of Italian Pre-war Colonies.	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 13-15
Fifth International Conference of Directors of Mine Safety Research Stations.	Pittsburgh . . . . .	Sept. 20-24
ILO (International Labor Organization): Joint Maritime Commission.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 20-25

### In Session as of October 1, 1948

Far Eastern Commission . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Feb. 26-
United Nations:		
Security Council . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	Mar. 25-
Military Staff Committee . . . . .	Lake Success . . . . .	Mar. 25-
<b>1947</b>		
Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question.	Lake Success . . . . .	Oct. 20-
General Assembly Special Committee on the Balkans . . . . .	Salonika and Geneva . . .	Nov. 21-
<b>1948</b>		
Temporary Commission on Korea . . . . .	Seoul . . . . .	Jan. 12-
Security Council's Kashmir Commission . . . . .	Geneva and Kashmir . . .	June 15-
General Assembly: Third Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 21-
<b>1946</b>		
German External Property Negotiations with Portugal (Safehaven) .	Lisbon . . . . .	Sept. 3-
<b>1948</b>		
Iru (International Telecommunication Union):		
Provisional Frequency Board	Geneva . . . . .	Jan. 15-
Planning Committee for High Frequency Broadcasting Conference .	Mexico City . . . . .	Sept. 13-
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Third Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors.	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 27-
International Monetary Fund: Third Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors.	Washington . . . . .	Sept. 27-
ILO (International Labor Organization): Technical Tripartite Conference on Safety in Factories.	Geneva . . . . .	Sept. 27-
WHO (World Health Organization): Expert Committee on Tuberculosis.	Paris . . . . .	Sept. 30-
Conference for the Establishment of the International Union for the Protection of Nature.	Fontainebleau . . . . .	Sept. 30-

### Scheduled October 1-31, 1948

Pan American Sanitary Organization:		
Meeting of Executive Committee . . . . .	Mexico City . . . . .	Oct. 2-3
Second Meeting of Directing Council . . . . .	Mexico City . . . . .	Oct. 4-16
Second Meeting of Wool Study Group . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 4-6

<sup>1</sup> Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.



## Calendar of Meetings—Continued

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea . . . . .	Copenhagen . . . . .	Oct. 4-11
Second Inter-American Conference on Indian Life . . . . .	Cuzco, Peru . . . . .	Oct. 10-20
Universal Postal Union: Meeting of the Provisional Executive and Liaison Committee.	Bern . . . . .	Oct. 11-
Ninth General Conference on Weights and Measures . . . . .	Paris and Sèvres . . . . .	Oct. 12-21
Bolivian International Fair . . . . .	La Paz . . . . .	Oct. 20-
Fourth Pan American Consultation on Cartography . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Oct. 15-
Who (World Health Organization):		
Expert Committee on Venereal Disease . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 15-19
Second Session of Executive Board . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 25-
Fifth Inter-American Congress of Surgery . . . . .	La Paz . . . . .	Oct. 17-21
Iru (International Telecommunication Union): International Conference on High Frequency Broadcasting.	Mexico City . . . . .	Oct. 22-
Second Meeting of South Pacific Commission . . . . .	Sydney . . . . .	Oct. 25-
International Tin Study Group: Third Meeting . . . . .	The Hague . . . . .	Oct. 25-
Ilo (International Labor Organization): Industrial Committee on Textiles: Second Session.	Cairo . . . . .	Oct. 26-

## U.S. Delegations to International Meetings

### Protection of Nature

The Department of State announced September 22 that Ira Noel Gabrielson, President, Wildlife Management Institute, Washington, has been designated Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Conference for the Establishment of the International Union for the Protection of Nature, scheduled to be held at Fontainebleau, France, September 30-October 7, 1948. Harold Jefferson Coolidge, Executive Secretary, Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, has been appointed to serve as delegate.

This Conference has been called by the French Government in conjunction with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to adopt a final constitution for the International Union for the Protection of Nature which was created provisionally by an international conference convened by the Swiss League for the Protection of Nature at Brunnen, Switzerland, in 1947.

### Wool

The Department of State announced on September 24 the United States Delegation to the Second Meeting of the International Wool Study Group, scheduled to be held at London, England, October 4-6, 1948. The Delegation is as follows:

#### Chairman

Donald D. Kennedy, Chief, International Resources Division, Department of State

#### Advisers

Rene Lutz, Office of International Trade, Department of Commerce

Floyd E. Davis, Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Paul O. Nyhus, Agricultural Attaché, American Embassy, London

October 3, 1948

The purpose of the meeting is to exchange information and views regarding the present general wool situation, to consider any specific problems that may have arisen since the last meeting held at London in March and April, 1947, and to discuss improvements in the organization and activities of the Study Group.

The establishment of the Wool Study Group was proposed at the International Wool Talks at London in 1946 when representatives from 13 countries substantially interested in the production, consumption, and trade of wool reviewed the world situation of apparel wool. The desirability of keeping the world position of wool under inter-governmental review was unanimously agreed upon at that meeting.

### Cartography

The Department of State announced on September 22 the United States Delegation to the Fourth Pan American Consultation on Cartography, scheduled to be held at Buenos Aires, Argentina, October 15-November 14, 1948. The Delegation is as follows:

#### Chairman

Robert H. Randall, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President; U.S. Member and Chairman, Commission on Cartography, Pan American Institute of Geography and History

#### Delegates

Lt. Col. Albert G. Foote, Commanding Officer, Aeronautical Chart Service, Department of the Air Force

Capt. Clement L. Garner (Retired), Former Chief, Division of Geodesy, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce

Charles B. Hitchcock, Assistant Director, American Geographical Society

Capt. Allen Hobbs, Hydrographer of the Navy, Department of the Navy



## ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

Col. John G. Ladd, Office of Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army  
Col. Freemont S. Tandy, Chief, Inter-American Geodetic Survey, Caribbean Defense Command, C.Z.  
Marshall S. Wright, Technical Assistant to the Chief, Office of Plans and Operations, Department of Agriculture

### Advisers

Capt. K. T. Adams, Chief, Division of Photogrammetry, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce  
Brig. Gen. Paul T. Cullen, Commanding General, 311th Air Division Reconnaissance, Topeka Air Force Base, Topeka, Kans.  
Harry T. Kelsh, Head, Methods and Standards Unit, Geological Survey, Department of the Interior  
Guillermo Medina, Chief Engineer, Hydrographic Office, Department of the Navy  
Col. William H. Mills, Commanding Officer, Army Map Service, Department of the Army  
Comdr. Elliott B. Roberts, Chief, Division of Geomagnetism and Seismology, U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Department of Commerce

### Adviser and Secretary

Andre C. Simonpietri, Special Adviser, Department of State

The Fourth Pan American Consultation on Cartography will be a meeting of the Commission on Cartography, one of several technical commissions of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History. The Cartography Commission, established by the Institute's Assembly held at Lima, Peru, in 1941 to further the surveying and mapping activities of the member governments of the Institute, provides the medium for the interchange of knowledge and techniques among the officials of

the American governments working in these fields.

At the Fourth Consultation on Cartography new developments and techniques in the field will be considered and the establishment of uniform standards of accuracy will be furthered. The meeting will be divided into the following committees: geodesy, including gravity and geomagnetism; topographic maps and aerial photogrammetry; aeronautical charts; hydrography, including tides and special maps; and urban surveys.

In addition to the committee sessions there will be an exhibit of instruments and equipment used in the production of all types of cartographic documents. This will be the first time that an exhibit of this nature has been held in connection with the Consultation. United States manufacturers of cartographic instruments have been invited by the Argentine Government to participate in the display. There will also be the regular exhibit of map products by member governments which is always a part of the Consultation.

The Third Pan American Consultation on Cartography was held concurrently with the Fourth General Assembly of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History at Caracas, Venezuela, August-September 1946. Invitations to participate in the forthcoming Consultation have been extended by the Argentine Government to all the American republics and Canada, to the members of the Commission on Cartography, and to interested international organizations.

## Executive Committee Achievements of ITO Interim Commission

[Released to the press September 20]

The Department of State announced on September 20 that a number of organizational and procedural agreements were reached at the recent second session of the Executive Committee of the Interim Commission of the International Trade Organization, held at Geneva.

The agenda of the second session consisted of a number of procedural and organizational matters. Several recommendations were considered and agreed upon by the Committee with respect to such items as the relationship of the ITO, when established, to other international organizations and bodies, such as the International Court of Justice, the International Monetary Fund, and the Food and Agriculture Organization; the expenses incurred during preparatory meetings which drafted the Havana ITO charter; and the preparation of an authentic Spanish text of the Havana charter for submission to those Spanish-speaking governments which are members of the Interim Commission.

The Commission was decided upon last winter when the charter for an International Trade Or-

ganization, known as the Havana charter, was drawn up at Havana by a conference at which some 57 countries participated and which lasted four and a half months. It was realized at Havana that it might take a considerable length of time for the charter to be ratified by the required number of governments. Therefore the Havana conference, by resolution, established an Interim Commission to deal with certain administrative and procedural matters which should be provided for before the Trade Organization itself would be established. The 53 member countries of the Interim Commission selected 18 of the members as an Executive Committee to perform these tasks. The use of the Interim Commission technique has also been adopted by the other specialized agencies set up by the United Nations, such as the health and refugee organizations.

The 18 countries selected are Australia, the Benelux countries (acting as a unit), Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Greece, India, Italy, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This Executive Commit-



tee held its first, purely organizational meeting in Havana directly after the Havana conference and elected Dana Wilgress, Canadian Minister in Bern, as Chairman. The second meeting of the Committee began in Geneva on August 25 and

ended on September 15. All the 18 member countries were represented. The United States Delegation was headed by Leroy D. Stinebower, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for economic affairs.

## Plans To Increase Value of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

[Released to the press September 22]

The second session of the contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which opened in Geneva on August 16, completed its work on September 14. It has laid plans designed to increase further the value of the agreement to the countries already parties, including the United States, and to enable more countries to become parties.

Under the general agreement itself, negotiated in 1947 by the United States and 22 other countries, each country agrees to certain general rules for the conduct of its international trade and grants to all the others a schedule of specific concessions in its tariff treatment of imports, including reductions in tariffs, bindings of moderate rates or of free treatment, reductions or eliminations of preferences, and the like. These concessions cover about one half of total world trade.

### Accession of New Countries

The major accomplishment of the meeting just ended is adoption of procedures for bringing additional countries into the agreement as rapidly as possible through tariff negotiations with them. On inquiry by the contracting parties it was found that several countries not yet parties are definitely interested in early accession. A timetable was accordingly adopted for negotiations with them. Requests for concessions are to be exchanged between the present parties and the new countries and also among the new countries by January 15, 1949. Definitive negotiations are scheduled to open at Geneva on April 11, 1949. The new countries which will negotiate are Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Nicaragua, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay.

So far as the United States is concerned, negotiations will be conducted under the usual trade-agreement procedure as recently amended by the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1948. The customary notice of intention to negotiate, accompanied by announcement of products to be considered for possible concession by this country, will be made as soon as the necessary preparatory work is completed by the interdepartmental trade-agreements organization.

### Other Tariff Negotiations

Except in certain special cases there will be no reopening of negotiations among the countries which are already parties to the agreement. Brazil, however, was granted temporary permission to establish rates on three items which are higher than otherwise permitted under the general agreement, in consideration of the fact that the Brazilian Congress has applied rates on a number of other items which are lower than the maximum permitted by the agreement. Within 60 days the interested countries are to negotiate a definitive adjustment of the concessions involved. Ceylon and Pakistan were also authorized to renegotiate certain concessions which each had granted to other countries. Cuba was granted permission to renegotiate with the United States the rates of duty on six items which Cuba is finding it difficult to apply as originally negotiated, the understanding being that the United States is to receive full compensation for any modifications agreed to. These adjustments are to be worked out bilaterally subject to final action at the time of the negotiations next spring. Any other negotiations among countries already parties to the agreement are likely to be in the nature of completion of work which it was not possible to finish at the 1947 conference, none of it involving the United States.

### Most-Favored-Nation Treatment for Western Germany

One of the most important achievements of the conference was agreement by a substantial number of countries to extend to Western Germany most-favored-nation treatment with respect to merchandise trade on a reciprocal basis. This undertaking is incorporated in a separate document, not a part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and was opened for signature on September 14. So far nine countries have signed, and it is expected that most of the remaining countries represented at the meeting will sign in the near future.

### Modification of General Agreement

Some changes were also made in the agreement which, it was felt by the contracting parties, were an improvement over the original text. These changes were based largely on work done at the Havana trade conference subsequent to the conclusion of the general agreement.



## ACTIVITIES AND DEVELOPMENTS

In addition, Chile was accorded an extension of time, to February 17, 1949, in which to become a contracting party to the agreement, even though after negotiating concessions at Geneva Chile did not put the agreement provisionally into effect by June 30, 1948, the time originally set.

Arrangements were made under which the United States will be free to accord preferences to imports from the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Though technically this constitutes establishment of a new preference, it will permit the working out of a trading arrangement which will promote the advancement of the peoples of the Trust Territory consistent with United States obligations under this country's trusteeship agreement with the Security Council of the United Nations.

### Cuban-American Trade

During the session just ended, the United States submitted to the contracting parties under article XXIII of the general agreement a problem arising out of an import licensing system applied by Cuba with respect to a wide range of products, including raw cotton and cotton, rayon and wool fabrics, and wearing apparel. Cuba's action had the effect of preventing the importation of these products from the United States and other countries, thus nullifying in considerable part the benefits granted by Cuba in the general agreement. The contracting parties recommended that Cuba promptly take steps to relieve the immediate difficulties and to consult with representatives of the United States Government at Habana with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution of the problems that have arisen in connection with the Cuban import controls under Cuban Resolution 530. On September 14 the Cuban Government issued a resolution removing restrictions on the importation of all products except piece-goods remnants and waste other than industrial. The restrictions on the importation of these products will be discussed by the Cuban Government and the United States Embassy at Habana.

### Discussions on Convention for Foreign Motor Travel

[Released to the press September 20]

To prepare for a new international convention designed to permit motorists to drive their cars in foreign countries, the Department of State is holding informal discussions with interested groups.

The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, composed of State officials responsible for issuing drivers' licenses and registration plates, endorsed the Department's plans at their annual meeting in Detroit September 10. On September 21 a meeting of private agencies, including motoring associations, bus and truck associations, and other highway-user groups, was held

in Washington to discuss the matter. In October representatives of all Federal Government agencies interested in highway and touring problems will meet in Washington for the same purpose. Out of these informal discussions is expected to develop a list of the main points which the United States will desire to have included in the proposed worldwide convention in order to make possible the adherence of this Government, for the benefit of American motorists.

Final action on the convention will be taken under the auspices of the United Nations, whose Economic and Social Council recently authorized the holding of an international conference for this purpose before the end of August 1949.

### South Pacific Commission Meeting

The Department of State announced on September 15 that the three United States Commissioners in the South Pacific Commission had arrived at Washington for a three-day period of consultation.

Those attending the series of meetings are:

*Senior Commissioner:* Felix M. Kessing, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford University.

*Commissioner:* Milton Shalleck, lawyer of New York City.

*Alternate Commissioner:* Karl C. Leebrick, Acting President of the University of Hawaii.

This will be the first meeting at Washington of the United States Commissioners, who were appointed by the President on April 28, 1948. It has been arranged in order that the Commissioners may confer with officers of this Government on matters relating to the South Pacific Commission. Among problems which the Commissioners will discuss are items on the agenda of the Second Session of the Commission to be convened at Sydney, Australia, on October 25.

The South Pacific Commission was established May 1948 as a regional advisory and consultative body on social and economic matters to the Governments of Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The territorial scope of the Commission comprises all those non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Ocean which are administered by these participating Governments and which lie wholly or in part south of the Equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea.

The Commission will be concerned primarily with subjects which are of every-day concern in the lives of the people, particularly agriculture (including animal husbandry), communications, transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labor, marketing, production, trade and finance, public works, education, health, housing, and social welfare.

Department of State Bulletin



### Bulgaria's Disregard for Obligations Under Peace Treaty and U. N. Charter

[Released to the press September 24]

*Text of an aide-mémoire delivered September 23, 1948, to Bulgarian Foreign Minister Kolarov by the American Minister in Sofia, Donald R. Heath*

The United States Government has noted that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in a speech in the Sobranje on September 4, is reported to have stated that Bulgaria has been scrupulous in fulfilling its obligations under the Peace Treaty, and to have attributed to the United States the rejection of Bulgaria's application for membership in the United Nations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is quoted as saying that "during the past year Bulgaria carried out and continues to carry out all she contracted under the Peace Treaty". On the contrary, from the very moment it signed the Treaty the Bulgarian Government has prosecuted a systematic and ruthless campaign to obliterate democratic opposition, in direct disregard of the fundamental principles of freedom which it undertook by Article 2 to secure. Through abuse of the instrumentalities of police power and subversion of judicial process, the Bulgarian Government has subjected substantial numbers of the Bulgarian people whose only crime was a belief in the rights of man, to involuntary servitude, banishment, concentration camps, imprisonment, torture and execution. It has obliterated the opposition press and by means of terror stifled free expression. On the day after it ratified the Peace Treaty the National Assembly adopted legislation declaring any attempt to reestablish under any form a political party which in the last elections, despite fraud and intimidation, was admitted by the Bulgarian Government to have polled over one-fourth of the total vote, to be a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death. The United States Government and the world was shocked when, one week after the Treaty came into effect, the Bulgarian

Government performed the judicial murder of Nikola Petkov.

As regards the reported claim of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Bulgaria is abiding by the provisions of the military clauses of the Treaty, the United States Government refers to its requests to observe the execution of the military provisions of the Treaty, such as Article 12, and to obtain officially information concerning the size of Bulgaria's military establishment, which have been rejected.

The United States Government would be happy to welcome Bulgaria into the United Nations. However, the Bulgarian Government has not shown itself qualified for membership in that organization under the provisions of the Charter. Aside from non-fulfillment of its international obligations under the Peace Treaty as noted above, a majority of the Security Council Balkan Commission of the United Nations in which Bulgaria seeks membership determined that the Bulgarian Government has supported on its territory guerrilla activity directed against Greece, a member of the United Nations, of which further confirmation, tantamount to an admission of guilt, is apparent in the effort Bulgaria has made to obstruct the work of that Commission and of the subsequent Special Balkan Committee of the General Assembly. In its Supplementary Report of September 10, 1948 to its Annual Report to the General Assembly, the Special Balkan Committee, in confirming its finding that such Bulgarian support is continuing, has declared that the conduct of Bulgaria "has been inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations". In the circumstances, Bulgaria's application has failed of support not only of the United States but also of the overwhelming majority of other members of the Security Council.

THE AMERICAN LEGATION,  
Sofia, September 23, 1948.

### Efforts To Assist Near Eastern Refugees

#### STATEMENT BY ACTING SECRETARY LOVETT

[Released to the press September 22]

It will be recalled that the late Count Bernadotte, United Nations mediator for Palestine, recently directed an appeal to the United States for aid to Near Eastern refugees. In response to the critical nature of this emergency, the Department's Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid is

mobilizing American voluntary resources, and substantial assistance has already been rendered by church and lay groups. In order to expedite delivery in the Near East of urgently needed supplies, the Department has authorized the American Mission for Aid to Greece to release certain foodstuffs and DDT, which will be replenished through

October 3, 1948



## THE RECORD OF THE WEEK

monetary contributions from American voluntary sources.

In Count Bernadotte's last report to the United Nations he laid particular emphasis on the fact

that aid provided to date is inadequate to meet any continuing need. It is hoped that the American people will respond with generosity and sympathy to this urgent need.

## PLANNING COMMITTEE APPOINTED

William L. Batt, Acting Chairman of the Advisory Committee, has appointed a planning committee composed of representatives of church, educational, industrial, and lay interests under the chairmanship of A. L. Warnshuis, in collaboration with the American Red Cross. The planning committee, which reports to all interested organizations and groups, is serving as a focal point for American relief activities. It is now engaged in the procurement of food supplies and is collaborating with the Christian Rural Overseas Program in obtaining wheat. It is also stimulating collections of clothing and blankets through the church organizations. The Near East Foundation is providing the planning committee with facilities for its operations and is serving as a repository for contributions. To insure its most effective use, American aid will be coordinated with the efforts of Sir Rafael Cilento, the mediator's Director of Relief Operations.

In response to the appeal for voluntary support a number of gifts in the form of monetary con-

tributions, supplies, and services are being made available from church and industrial sources. Additional assistance is being rendered. The American Red Cross is providing the services of expert personnel to assist in refugee activities and has donated two ambulances to the Syrian Red Crescent. It has also made available medical supplies valued at \$50,000 in addition to its earlier contributions estimated at \$450,000.

These efforts to alleviate the critical situation of the Near Eastern refugees are being pursued with the unqualified support of the Department of State. The major portion of these refugees, of whom 75 percent are women and children, are now destitute. Thousands are without funds, shelter, or adequate supplies of food, water, and clothing. Medical and sanitary facilities are too limited to meet the needs of the present situation. The Department is hopeful that this great humanitarian problem will meet with the sympathetic response of the American people.

## Incident Involving Seating of Ethiopian Minister at Science Meeting

### EXCHANGE OF MEMORANDA BETWEEN DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION

[Released to the press September 23]

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION  
Washington, D.C.

*September 20, 1948*

The Imperial Ethiopian Legation acknowledges the receipt of the memorandum from the Department of State dated September 17th, expressing regret for the incident involving His Excellency Ras Imru, Minister of Ethiopia, on September 13, 1948.

The Legation, while very much appreciative for the endeavor of the Department to investigate into the circumstances of the case with a view toward taking appropriate action, regrets to state that the information given to the Department of State by the Organizations and individuals mentioned in the memorandum, alleging that the Minister was seated first in the box by mistake and was subsequently requested to move to the orchestra, which was assigned to him is incorrect. The explanation in the memorandum of the Department, therefore, which was based on such information and tending to justify the indignity and injury suffered by the Minister, is unacceptable to the Legation.

The Minister had in his hands tickets bearing Box Nos. E-2, 4, 6, and 8, issued to him and the other members of the Legation by the American Association for the Advancement of Science, of which corresponding numbers were clearly shown on the Boxes. His Excellency went direct to the Boxes marked with the same numbers of the tickets in his hand and presented his tickets to an usher who was standing by and who checked the corresponding numbers of the tickets and the boxes and invited the Minister to choose one of the four seats mentioned hereinabove. His Excellency took Box No. 8, and it was from that same Box that he was told to leave.

For the verification of the fact stated above, and to enable the Department in its investigation of the case toward taking appropriate action as demanded in the previous note of this Legation, herewith is enclosed one of the tickets which the American Association for the Advancement of Science issued to His Excellency and members of his Legation for attending the ceremony on 13th September and which the Minister had in his hand on that date when the incident occurred.

**Department of State Bulletin**



The Department of State acknowledges the receipt of the note from the Imperial Ethiopian Legation, dated September 20, 1948, making further reference to the incident involving the Honorable Ras Imru, Minister of Ethiopia, at Constitution Hall on September 13, 1948.<sup>1</sup>

The Department, while reiterating its regret for the embarrassment caused the Minister, wishes to inform the Imperial Ethiopian Legation that its further investigations into the case, based on the information contained in the Legation's note under reference, confirm that the incident was solely the result of a series of misunderstandings.

The Department has examined the ticket enclosed with the Legation's note and finds that it bears the following inscription, the first two lines of which are printed and the third line typewritten:

GUEST ADMISSION  
Box No.

---

Reserved Seats E-2, 4, 6, 8.

It is apparent that the American Association for the Advancement of Science used a form guest ticket for the meeting on September 13. In the case of those Chiefs of Mission who were assigned box seats, the box number was inserted in the proper place by the Association. In the case, however, of those Chiefs of Mission who were assigned orchestra seats, the location of the reserved seats was typed in below the box reference. Owing to the Association's failure to delete the reference to the box, it is quite understandable that the Minister concluded that the seats reserved to him were in a box rather than on the floor of the auditorium. Furthermore, this impression was apparently confirmed when the usher, after examining the ticket, unfortunately made the mistake of directing the Minister to a box seat instead of to the orchestra seat assigned to him.

The Department's examination of the seating arrangement employed by the Association confirms this explanation. The boxes at Constitution Hall are numbered and bear no letter designation. E-2, 4, 6, 8, identify seat locations in the orchestra, rather than box locations.

The Department hopes that the foregoing satisfactorily explains the cause of the embarrassment to which the Minister was so regrettably subjected.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  
*Washington, September 22, 1948*

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 26, 1948, p. 413.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1948, p. 211.

## Radiotelegraph Service With Saudi Arabia

*Telegram from Secretary Marshall to the American Minister at Jidda, J. Rives Childs*

[Released to the press September 17]

*September 16, 1948*

Please convey to the Minister of Foreign Affairs my felicitations on the opening of direct radiotelegraph service between the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and express to him the satisfaction this Government takes in the establishment of this channel of communications between our two countries.

In this, the first message to be sent over this circuit, I wish also to express appreciation for the assistance rendered by the Legation for the past several years in bringing this circuit into existence.

## Letter of Credence

*Egypt*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Egypt, Mohamed Kamel Abdul Rahim Bey, presented his letters of credence to the President on September 14, 1948. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 731 of September 14.

## Attackers of Stephen Haas Apprehended

[Released to the press September 10]

The American Embassy in Cairo has received a note dated August 22 from the Egyptian Foreign Office in reply to the Embassy's notes of July 19 and July 24 regarding the death of Stephen Haas.<sup>2</sup> After renewing the Egyptian Government's expression of deep regret for this unfortunate occurrence, the note states that three persons believed responsible for the attack have been apprehended and charged with the crime before the appropriate court and that they will receive the punishment they merit.

## Ceylon Appoints First Ambassador to U.S.

In pursuance of an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Ceylon to exchange diplomatic representatives at the Embassy level, Felix Cole was accredited recently as Ambassador of the United States of America to Ceylon.

The Ceylon Government has now decided, in consultation with the Government of the United States, to appoint G. C. S. Corea, presently the Ceylon Government representative in London as Ceylon's first Ambassador to the United States. Mr. Corea is expected to assume the duties of his new post early in October 1948.



## Italy Expresses Gratitude for Economic Assistance

[Released to the press by the White House September 17]

*Letter from Alcide de Gasperi, President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, to President Truman, after the signing of the economic-cooperation agreement by Italy and the United States*

Rome, July 6, 1948

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In signing the Economic Cooperation Agreement with the Government of the United States, the Italian Government and people are fully aware of the gravity and importance of their undertaking. The number and range of recent debates in political circles and in the press are an indication of how thoroughly the commitment is appreciated in this country. We are likewise aware that the decision taken by Congress is the result of much consideration and debate by the public opinion of the United States, and that genuine concern is felt for the wise administration and best employment of American aid so generously tendered for the recovery of Europe.

My Government is fully appreciative of these considerations, and it is our resolve that our obligations under the Economic Cooperation Agreement be discharged in their spirit and in full.

I wish to reassure you that I will devote my personal attention to the execution of the Agreement, and will be in close and constant touch with those of my colleagues and advisers, in and outside the Cabinet, who are in charge of the Administration of the Plan. I shall therefore be most grateful, in the event of general or particular problems arising which, in your opinion or in that of your advisers, require special consideration or re-examination, if you will cause me to be personally informed.

Four years have now elapsed since from this newly released Capital we set about the mighty task of rebuilding the country. With the unstinted help of the people of America, we then repaired the wrecked fabric of our administration. More recently we have succeeded in establishing the democratic method. Now we go forward—again with your aid—to achieve full recovery both as a Nation and as a component and complementary part of world economy.

I feel confident that the concerted effort of so many wills to work effectively, and the firm desire to collaborate in the joint interests of peace and the economic welfare of so many millions of

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of May 2, 1948, p. 584.

men cannot fail, Mr. President, to carry us through successfully to our end.

I am, my dear Mr. President,  
respectfully yours,  
DE GASPERI

*Letter from President Truman to Premier De Gasperi*

September 16, 1948

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

Thank you for the letter you wrote to me after signing the Economic Cooperation Agreement.

Men everywhere participate in and contribute more effectively to an undertaking when the terms and purposes are clearly understood and the commitments are freely undertaken. The great amount of discussion in our respective countries and the large consensus in favor of the Agreement augurs well for its success.

The American people support this program wholeheartedly both for humanitarian and for practical reasons. In a world growing smaller day by day, no nation can profit by isolating itself. Mutual dependence means that your welfare affects our welfare and vice versa. Therefore, for our sake, for your sake, and for the sake of all other like-minded countries, it is our hope that the program in Italy and elsewhere will be crowned with success.

I express my admiration for the will to work shown by the Italian people in their most difficult moments. I admire also the sense of moderation and political maturity shown by your people who have regained so recently the privileges and responsibilities inherent in a liberal democracy.

I am certain that with the broad participation in the Recovery Program of all elements in the Italian nation, with your demonstrated will to work, and with your political maturity, Italy will play a significant constructive part in the European Recovery Program.

With cordial greetings, I am

Very sincerely yours,  
HARRY S. TRUMAN

## No Time Limit on Filing Claims for Property Loss in Italy

[Released to the press September 9]

The attention of the Department of State has been called to statements in the press which have been interpreted by residents of the United States as indicating that claims of American citizens for compensation on account of damage to, or removal or destruction of, property in Italy during the war, must be filed by September 15, 1948.<sup>1</sup> The Department points out that no time limit has as yet been fixed for the filing of claims of that character.



## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

## Facts Relating to Withdrawal of Donald F. Ewing From Legation at Sofia

[Released to the press September 5]

With reference to the report of the Bulgarian radio concerning the withdrawal from the American Legation in Sofia of Vice Consul Donald F. Ewing, the following are the facts in the matter.

On July 16, 1948, in response to their request, Vice Consul Ewing agreed to meet, outside the Legation, two Bulgarian acquaintances whom he had previously known in connection with the visa work of the Legation to which he was assigned but had not seen in several months. The Bulgarian secret police arrested the two Bulgarians in Mr. Ewing's company, and on the basis of a document of which the contents are unknown allegedly "found" in the pocket of one of them and of alleged subsequent "confessions" on their part to the effect that they had been engaging in "espionage" for the United States through Ewing, the Bulgarian Government declared Ewing *persona non grata* and requested his recall.

The American Minister protested to the Bulgarian Government the arbitrary nature of that Government's action on the basis of a transparently fabricated maneuver on the part of Bulgarian authorities.

Mr. Ewing has left Bulgaria.

## Consular Offices at Matamoros and Agua Prieta To Remain Open

[Released to the press September 21]

The American Consulates at Matamoros and Agua Prieta, Mexico, will not be closed September 30, as previously announced. These two important Foreign Service posts on the United States-Mexican border will be kept open for at least four more months, when the question will be re-examined.

The decision to continue to maintain the posts at Matamoros and Agua Prieta was reached at a conference of Department of State and Foreign Service officials in Washington, where communications protesting the closing of the posts were considered. Among those asking that the posts be maintained were Senators Tom Connally and W. Lee O'Daniel of Texas; Senators Ernest W. McFarland and Carl Hayden of Arizona; Congressmen Milton H. West and Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas; Congressman-elect Lloyd Benson of Texas; the chambers of commerce of Brownsville, San Benito, Corpus Christi, and Weslaco, Tex., and Bisbee and Douglas, Ariz.; the Brownsville Rotary

Club; and a considerable number of prominent citizens, including Curtis Vinson of the Brownsville *Herald*, Salvador Loya of the Brownsville Palm-Hat Factory, S. A. Albert Mendelsohn of the Cananea Consolidated Copper Company, and Frank Greene of the Greene Cananea Cattle Company.

Following the conference John E. Peurifoy, Assistant Secretary of State for administration, announced that the Mexican border posts would be kept open at least temporarily. He said:

"It is never pleasant to consider the closing of one of our posts abroad, particularly ones so long in existence and in areas so thriving as Matamoros and Agua Prieta, but it is our clear duty on the other hand constantly to review all our posts and maintain only as many as, under available appropriations, can be properly supported in the performance of their functions as required by law.

"The decision against continuing to maintain Matamoros and Agua Prieta seemed unavoidable. It was taken only after long and serious consideration, and with the greatest reluctance.

"As a result of the earnest solicitations offered by the representatives of Congress and others interested, however, we have reconsidered the matter in the hope that these posts may be maintained without break. At considerable sacrifice elsewhere we have succeeded in finding ways and means of keeping these offices open for at least the next four months. By that time we should know more about the future and it will then be appropriate to reexamine the situation."

Located across the Rio Grande River from Brownsville, Tex., Matamoros is an important center of inter-American commerce. It is joined to the United States by the connection of the National Railroad Lines of Mexico to two American railroads, by a recently completed link of the Inter-American Highway, and by airlines operating out of a nearby international airport. Through Matamoros is funneled bus, truck, and automobile traffic serving the commercial and tourist trade between two nations.

Agua Prieta, located opposite Douglas, Ariz., is in the midst of a rapidly developing minerals area and is thus the center of increasing trade between the United States and Mexico.

## THE DEPARTMENT

## Appointment of Officer

Arthur B. Berthold, as Chief of the Bibliography Branch, Division of Libraries and Reference Services, effective September 17, 1948.



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